War and the City by Gregory J. Ashworth

Author:Gregory J. Ashworth
Language: eng
Format: mobi, pdf
Tags: Social Science, Science, Earth Sciences, Human Geography, Architecture, Urban & Land Use Planning, Geography
ISBN: 9781134939152
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1991-09-04T21:00:00+00:00

URBAN MILITARY OPERATIONS

The effects of these general characteristics of the urban environment as a battle terrain upon military operations in urban areas can now be considered in more detail, drawing upon the very limited range of historical experience available and also upon the future scenarios which have shaped training for such battles since the Second World War.

The strategic scale

Warsaw Pact ‘urban doctrine’ is among the most clearly articulated set of guidelines for urban operations developed since 1945. A first principle is to avoid major conurbations but, having determined that a defended city is to be taken (rather than masked and bypassed) then the series of actions

Figure 5.1Warsaw Pact idealized urban attack

summarized in Figure 5.1 is initiated (Lewis 1982). Although intended for a contemporary scenario, these would not have been unfamiliar in any period since the introduction of mechanization, and have most recently been restated in an only slightly modified form by the Israeli defence forces (Mercillon 1982) as a result of their Lebanon experience. The advanced, fast-moving echelons attempt to overrun the city before preparations for its defence can be initiated. If this rather optimistic possibility fails, then the advanced units bypass the built-up area, seizing (with air-landed support if necessary) critical bridges and road junctions, thus blocking potential lines of reinforcement, resupply or withdrawal, and wait for second-echelon reinforcements. Probing reconnaissance attacks in relatively small units are then mounted to determine the direction and nature of the main assault, which is then undertaken by specialized, motorized infantry units—supported where necessary by tanks held in reserve. The objective is to seize transport, communication and command centres so as to fragment the defence into isolated pockets. Reconnaissance assumes a critical role in mitigating the problems of loss of command control once the main assault is under way and unfamilarity with the local terrain. The synchronization of this external assault with an internal insurgency (aimed at reducing the defenders’ mobility, control over the battle, and morale) is regarded as an ideal situation more likely to occur in friendly than hostile territory—as reported by Rustin (1980) for current Yugoslav urban defensive practice.

Given the assumed stategic objectives in the European central front during a potential major conventional conflict, Warsaw Pact guidelines for the defence of cities were much more rudimentary, amounting to little more than a resolution to fight outside the city and to prevent the initial envelopment. The emphasis in NATO doctrine has been the mirror image of the Soviets, based on very similar preconceptions. The cities, and especially the denselybuilt-up central areas of the large West German conurbations (such as Hanover and Braunschweig), are to be used as defendable strong-points. Thus the assumed Soviet numerical superiority in armour is to be neutralized by the deployment of infantry, including local territorial units, in a series of delaying actions, which blunt and absorb the Soviet thrusts for long enough to allow either inter-continental reinforcement (‘Operation Reforger’ and the like) or political resolutions to occur.

Such scenarios dominated strategic thinking in Europe between 1950 and 1990, and accorded a special importance to towns.

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